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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20050535-CA
JEFFREY HOUSTON,
Defendant and Appellant.

ARGUMENTS.
POINT III (CONTINUED).
THE STATE IMPERMISSIBLY REQUEST THIS COURT TO PRESUME
REGULARITIES IN THE PROCEEDINGS; IN STEAD OF INDULGING THE
PRESUMPTION OF NO WAIVER OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AND
REQUIRING THE STATE TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THROUGH
SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE RECORD, AS REQUIRED BY THE COURTS.
In this matter, the record reflects that Mr. Houston was indigent. R. at 344-348. That
finding was made on January 28, 2005, apparently following Defendant's conviction of thirteen
counts of Precursor violations all second degree felonies. The finding of the court prior to trial
on January 26, 2005 was that the request was untimely claiming that Mr. Houston had ample

opportunity to retain counsel. T-l, at 8. However, as the record also reflects Mr. Houston did
have counsel for near two years - Margret Taylor, but for her ineffective assistance of counsel
prior to trial, he would havefee^represented by an attorney at the time of trial. R. at 280. The
•W
court inappropriate attributed Ms. Taylor's failures and delay upon Mr. Houston and permitted
her withdrawal simply alleging the appearance of a conflict. Its bad enough that counsel
inappropriately waived Mr. Houston's right to a preliminary hearing without his consent or
knowledge but its quite another that her personal agenda to legalize drugs actually resulted in
additional charges against him being applied in the State's two amended Informations. See, i.e.,
R. at 76, 80, 83 233, 235, 242, 258 & 261.
The matter before the Court as characterized by the State is that Mr. Houston abandoned
or otherwise waived his right to counsel. Appellee's Br. pp. 10-20. In its arguments that State
allegations are two-fold. One, the State claims that the presumption is one of regularity rather
than the presumption against a waiver of a fundamental constitutional right as argued by
Houston. Appellee's Br. p. 15; Aplt's Br. pp. 33-37. The next contention raised by the State is
that Houston abandoned his right to counsel by conduct, but there is an inadequate record to
prove it. Appellee's Br. pp. 12-16. This reply brief is submitted to address both propositions.
A.

Defendant Houston Did Not Waive His Riffht To Counsel and It is The State's
Burden To Prove That a Waiver Did Occur.

In reviewing the issues before this Court is it important to consider what aspects did not
occur, to wit: Whether Mr. Houston requested to represent himself; whether he was offered
choices; or whether Mr. Houston refused assistance of counsel?
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I.

Self-Representation Request and Assistance of Counsel Presumption.

The Utah Supreme Court reviewed, the right of self-representation in State v. Bakalov.
979 P.2d 799 (Utah 1999). In that matter, the Supreme Court required that record must show that
the defendant's "'clearly and unequivocally'" requested it. Id., at 808 (citing United States v.
McKinlev. 58 F.3d 1475, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Reddeck. 22 F.3d
1504, 1510 (10th Cir. 1994)). The requirement that a defendant make an explicit request ensures
that the defendant will not unthinkingly waive the right to counsel through sporadic musings or,
on appeal, mischaracterize statements he made in the trial court and claim that he was denied the
benefit of counsel if he proceeded pro se, or that he was denied the right to self-representation if
he was represented by counsel. See Adams v. Carroll 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989). If a
defendant equivocates in his request to represent himself, he is presumed to have requested the
assistance of counsel. See Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019
(1938). A defendant's assertion of the right of self-representation must be voluntary, the product
of a free and meaningful choice. See State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987).
In this matter, it is clear by the record that Mr. Houston did not request to represent
himself. Early on, on January 7, 2003, Mr. Houston requested to hire private counsel. R. at 3;
Appellee's Br. at "Add. B." It is equally clear that he did not refuse the assistance of counsel
either. T-l, at 8; Aplt's Br. p. 14. Before trial commenced, the Court addressed the
circumstances surrounding Houston's request for counsel be appointed and the timeliness of
Houston's filing of an Affidavit of Indigency. T-l, at 8-11.
Having concluded Mr. Houston had not timely requested his right to representation, the
Court however said nothing to protect Houston through honoring the presumption that Mr.
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Houston was otherwise entitled to the assistance of counsel nonetheless. See Johnson v. Zerbst
304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938). Even though the findings of the Court
were one of untimeliness, the findings were clearly erroneous. Under the circumstances,
Houston's conduct was "excusable neglect" addressed below.

IL

Defendant's Choices Concerning Representation/Self-Representation.

In this matter, the Court failed to offer Houston any substantial choices either. A
defendant cannot be forced to proceed with incompetent counsel or counsel having a conflict of
interests: "[A] choice between proceeding with incompetent counsel or no counsel is in essence
no choice at all." Wilks v. Israel 627 F.2d 32, 36 (7th Cir. 1980). Requiring a defendant to
choose between self-representation and some other course of action does not always enable a
defendant to make a totally voluntary decision. "If a choice presented to a petitioner is
constitutionally offensive, then the choice cannot be voluntary." IdL However, if the defendant's
options are constitutionally sound, the choice between alternatives is voluntary. See id. In this
case, Mr. Houston was not given the choice of private counsel or public defender. The only time
that offer was made was at the outset, on January 7, 2003. R. at 3; Appellee's Br. "Add. B."
After Houston hired private counsel, Margret Taylor, Houston received ineffective assistance as
counsel as described in Houston's opening brief at pages 5-12. In June 2003, Ms. Taylor filed a
motion to dismiss arguing her own agenda seeking to legalize drugs. R. at 56. Ms. Taylor
waived without consulting Mr. Houston his right to a preliminary hearing, of which Mr. Houston
denies agreeing to waive. R. at 146; T-l, at 8. Ms. Taylor missed a motion to suppress filing
deadline causing Houston to lose another opportunity to weigh the State's evidence. R. at 233,
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237. Ms. Taylor then filed a motion to sever the seventeen counts asserting prejudice at trial only
to then withdraw the motion without a judicial opinion. R. at 240, 242, 255, 265. Subsequently
at the day of a cancelled trial where a change of plea had been hoped for, Ms. Taylor motioned
for a withdrawal as counsel and was granted the motion, on the grounds "there appears to be a
conflict between the defendant and his counsel." R. at 180. The decision of the Court was
constitutionally offensive and prejudicial, and is not adequately supported by proper findings
including concerning the nature of conflict, desire of the defendant, inability of counsel as an
officer of the court to rise about the conflict, alternative assistance of counsel, availability of a
substitution, etc.
In summation, the State cannot meet its burden to show that Houston had a voluntary
choice in the loss of his counsel, Margret Taylor. The decision to release Ms. Taylor is
unequivocally the choice of counsel and was permitted by the Court without additional warning
to the defendant or any information elucidating other options.

III.

No Abandonment by Intent or Implied by Alleged Conduct.

The two issues above are not disputed between the parties. The disputed issue presented
by the State in it's responsive brief is whether Mr. Houston waived his right to counsel through
his conduct. Appellee's Br. pp. 16-20. The State contends that Mr. Houston waived his right to
counsel by his conduct. The record states, "[AJfter Ms. Margret Taylor's services were
terminated on November 18, 2004, the court ordered defendant to appear before the court on
several occasions and advise the court on his progress in hiring counsel." R. at 526. The Court
continued, "Each time the court admonished . . . the importance of employing counsel but
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defendant procrastinated the hiring of counsel even though he was working in the coal mines."
Id The State, in its responsive brief, at page 19, argues, "These statements suggest that the court
properly warned defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . .
Defendant has not presented a record upon which this Court can review his claim that the trial
court failed to adequately warning (sic) him of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation." Appellee Br. p. 19. From this remark, the State urges this Court to adopt the
belief this Court must "assume that the trial court adequately warned defendant of the
consequences of dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and that his waiver was
knowing and intelligent." Appellee's Br. p. 20. The argument of the State is belied by the court
record.
The record fails to identify any kind of colloquy and the State failed to attempt to a
supplementation of the record if it thought such a colloquy existed. See, e.g., State v. Frampton,
737 P.2d 183, 188 (Utah 1987) (example of colloquy). The fact is the court's minutes failed to
suggest where a colloquy might of even occurred. In Frampton, the Supreme Court directed the
following or similar instructions were necessary:
(a) Have you ever studied law?
(b) Have you ever represented yourself or any other defendant in a criminal action?
(c) You realize, do you not, that you are charged with these crimes: (Here state the
crimes with which the defendant is charged.)
(d) You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty of the crime charged in Count I,
the court... could sentence you to as much as
years in prison and fine you as much
as $
? (Then ask him a similar question with respect to each other crime with
which he may be charged in the indictment or information.)
(e) You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty of more than one of those
crimes this court can order that the sentences be served consecutively, that is, one after
another?
(f) You realize, do you not, that if you represent yourself, you are on your own? I
cannot tell you how you should try your case or even advise you as to how to try your
case.
6

(g) Are you familiar with the ... Rules of Evidence?
(h) You realize, do you not, that the ... Rules of Evidence govern what evidence may or
may not be introduced at trial and, in representing yourself, you must abide by those
rules?
(i) Are you familiar with the ... Rules of Criminal Procedure?
(j) You realize, do you not, that those rules govern the way in which a criminal action is
tried in ... court?
(k) You realize, do you not, that if you decide to take the witness stand, you must
present your testimony by asking questions of yourself? You cannot just take the stand
and tell your story. You must proceed question by question through your testimony.
(1) (Then say to the defendant something to this effect): I must advise you that in my
opinion you would be far better defended by a trained lawyer than you can be by yourself.
I think it is unwise of you to try to represent yourself. You are not familiar with the law.
You are not familiar with court procedure. You are not familiar with the Rules of
Evidence. I would strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself.
(m) Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if you are found guilty and in
light of all the difficulties of representing yourself, is it still your desire to represent
yourself and to give up your right to be represented by a lawyer?
(n) Is your decision entirely voluntary on your part?
(o) If the answers to the two preceding questions are in the affirmative, you should then
say something to the following effect: "I find that the defendant has knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to counsel. I will therefore permit him to represent himself."
(p) You should consider the appointment of standby counsel to assist the defendant and
to replace him if the court should determine during trial that the defendant can no longer
be permitted to represent himself.
Id., at 188. No where in the record for the dates of January 7, 2003, November 18, 2004,
December 7, 2004, January 4, 2005, and January 19, 2005 does the record suggest
a colloquy. At no point was it the intentions of Mr. Houston to represent himself. At all stages
Mr. Houston wanted to be represented by counsel. Instead, the Court on January 26, 2005,
required Mr. Houston on the morning of his trial to represent himself. In response, the defendant
requested a continuance. T-l, 17-18.
The State's contentions without citation to the record that Mr. Houston was warned,
repeatedly to obtain counsel, or else he was lose his right to counsel is inappropriate. No such
admonishment from the bench occurred. "Courts should indulge every reasonable presumption
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against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." State v. Meinhart 617 P.2d 355, 357 (Utah
1990) (quoting from Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461
(1938). "When human life is at stake, it is the duty of the court to interfere ad see that the
defendant is not deprived of a fair t r i a l . . . . A conviction contrary to the weight of the evidence
will be set aside." People of the Territory of Utah v. Thiede. 11 Utah 241, 39 P. 837 (1895)
(citations omitted). In this matter, the overwhelming weight of the evidence presented in the
record casts serious doubt that the trial Mr. Houston was afforded was fair, including the
assistance of counsel.
The trial was unfair to Defendant. It is well settled without a need to provide citation.
The burden of proof in a criminal trial is proof beyond reasonable doubt. The trial in this matter
without the assistance of counsel resulted in a conviction upon "uncorroborated hearsay." The
Supreme Court of the United States, in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28
L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971), has held that "Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence." "Substantial evidence" is a far lower burden of proof. The Supreme
Court defined "substantial evidence" as meaning "more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id., at
401. The testimony of Jennifer McNair was uncorroborated hearsay as to the work performed
by Kevin Smith, a Senior Criminalist at the State Crime Lab, and the testimony of clandestine
labs and the conduct of others was all pure rumor. T-l, 43-45. At trial, McNair admitted the
work was performed by Kevin Smith and she affirmatively testified that she did not test the
substance limiting herself to a review of Smith's materials only. T-l, 45. Having either
representation at the time of trial, or even the assistance of counsel at trial, a law-trained attorney
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competent in the profession, would have avoided the admission of such uncorroborated hearsay
and rumors which are absolutely inadmissible in a criminal trial. The only way the lab results
would be corroborated is if the testifying expert had tested the contraband herself. Admittedly,
that did not occur. T-l, at 45.
Here in this matter, the State contends that the presumption of regularity is the standard
and suggests that the record was inadequate for this Court to consider the issue of Mr. Houston's
claim for right of counsel. That presumption of regularity, generally is the norm. However,
given the fact that the right to counsel at trial is a fundamental right. The presumption is against
a waiver as noted in State v. Meinhart, 617 P.2d 355 (Utah 1980) and Johnson v. Zerbst 304
U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed 1461 (1938). The request by the State to assume
regularity in the district court proceedings is impermissible concerning the waiver of
constitutional rights. The State bears a strict burden of showing an alleged waiver of a
constitutional right, including the right to counsel at trial. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 241, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2055, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). The strict standard of waiver has been
applied to those rights guaranteed to a criminal defendant to insure that he will be accorded the
greatest possible opportunity to utilize every facet of the constitutional model of a fair criminal
trial. IcL, at 241; see also, State v. Bolsinger. 699 P.2d 1214, 1222 (Utah 1985). In light of the
State's strict burden imposed by Bustamonte and Bolsingen the proper course of action the State
should have taken if it truly believed the record was inadequate was to seek a supplementation of
the record in order to demonstrate a waiver occurred. Even the findings of the judge on the day
of trial contradicts the State's assertion, however. The right to have the assistance of counsel in a
criminal trial is a fundamental constitutional right which must be jealously protected by the trial
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court. State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998). The day of trial, the judge made findings, its
findings failed to reveal a colloquy. Moreover, the findings failed to properly state facts which
could leave a reasonable jurist to believe a waiver occurred. In stead, the findings admittedly
only attempted to justify the court's desire to find that the affidavit of indigency was untimely.
Even that conclusion was not properly adduced by the Court. If an accused is indigent, he is
entitled to court-appointed counsel. See State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1986).
Timing has little to do with it.
Given the fact that no waiver or abandonment occurred, this Court should reverse and
remand. In order to find that an abandonment occurred, the State has the strict burden to
demonstrate a waiver. In the alternative, the State would be required to seek supplementation of
the record to reveal rebuttal evidence to a defendants affirmative statements that the right had
been denied. The State's suggestion of handling the appeal by drawing inferences from a
presumption of regularity is not the established approach. The proper means to handle the issue
is to presume a violation of a constitutional right and permit the State to rebut the presumption.
Barnard v. Wasserman, 855 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993) (although courts indulge a presumption
against waiver of constitutional rights, the presumption is rebuttable); Pitts v. Board of Educ,
869 F.2d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1989). Waiver is deemed to occur when the totality of the
circumstances indicates an intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known constitutional
right. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981); Johnson
v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938); Pitts, 869 F.2d at 557.
And that Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 64, 77 L. Ed. 158, holds to
constitute due process of law in his trial the defendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at
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every step in the proceedings against him," unless he intelligently and understandingly waives
counsel. Because the determination that a defendant has intelligently waived his right to counsel
"turns 'upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused,'" id, at 732 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst
304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938)), the constitutionality of an
accused's waiver of the right to counsel is a mixed question involving both fact and law. See
State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah App. 1996). In this matter, there is no showing of a
intentional and knowing abandonment. Quite to the contrary, Houston sought a finding of
indigency as requested of him by the Court through the submission of an affidavit. R. at 344346. The fact that it was deficient should be evidence alone of Mr. Houston's inability to
effectively represent himself. T-l, at 11. The only question before this Court is whether Mr.
Houston made a good faith attempt to secure new counsel or whether he knowingly and
intentionally by acting dilatory knowingly and intentionally abandoned his right to counsel. Mr.
Houston denies that he acted dilatory. He also denies abandoning his right to counsel. If this
Court wants to find that Mr. Houston neglected to obtain counsel timely, the Court should also
find under the totality of the circumstances the neglect was excusable, as so should have the trial
judge.

B.

Under the Totality of the Circumstances, Excusable Neglect Exists Even if the State
Rebuts the Presumption.
Excusable neglect has been approved as "good cause." Clearly the facts occurring before

the trial judge the days leading into trial stated above constitute "good cause." The failure to
timely service is without dispute "neglect." The pivotal question then for the Court to decide is

whether the explanation provided under all the circumstances is "excusable" even if the State
were able to rebut the State's initial presumption.
The Supreme Court of the United States has noted that "excusable neglect" is a
"somewhat elastic concept," not limited exclusively to omissions caused by circumstances
outside the moving party's control, but which must be assessed in view of all relevant
circumstances surrounding the omission. Pioneer Inv. Serves. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.
Fship, 507 U.S. 380, 390-95, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1496-98, 123 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1993) (construing
excusable neglect in context of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), which was patterned after Rule 6(b)).

POINT IV.
THE STATE'S RELIANCE ON PEDOCKIE IS SUPPORTIVE OF HOUSTON;
HOWEVER, THE STATE MISCONSTRUES THE CASE AGAINST HOUSTON.

In this matter, the State relies on Pedockie, 2006 UT 28,1J33 (Utah Supreme Court, May
12, 2006); that reliance is misplaced and is apparently misrepresented. The State argues, "An
implied waiver, like a true waiver, in addition to being voluntary, must also be 'knowing and
intelligent.' Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ^ 33 (citing Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1102). In other words, in
addition to knowing the consequences of continued misconduct, the defendant must cpossess[] an
awareness of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation at the time of the implied
waiver.' Id. '[T]the trial court must ensure that the defendant is cognizant of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation' and that his waiver is therefore knowing and intelligent. Id.
at U 38." A review ofPedockie, Attachment "A," demonstrate it is clearly supporting of Mr.
Houston's contentions. On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court held that Pedockie voluntarily
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waived his right to counsel through his dilatory conduct. It nevertheless, reversed his conviction,
holding that the waiver was not knowing and intelligent. The Supreme Court then affirmed the
reversal of the conviction, but on different grounds. The Court stated, "Like the court of appeals,
we recognize that an accused may voluntarily waive his right to counsel through his conduct.
But we find no such voluntary waiver in this case." Pedockie's conduct more egregious than
suggested about Houston, if the Courts could not agree with the district court that a waiver of
counsel occurred there, this Court should not find that such a waiver was the result here. Just as
in this case, the Court of Appeals, this Court, stated that it need not decide the question of
"knowing and intelligent" because there was "nothing in the record to persuade [it] that
[Pedockie's] waiver was knowing and intelligent." Inasmuch as the issues and the likely
outcomes between this appeal and Pedockie, the State should have agreed to remand this matter
as the controlling case law is adverse to the State's position.

MOTION FOR FRIVOLOUS FINDINGS.
Consequently, this Court should find that the State's defense on appeal is without merit
and is therefore frivolous. With a finding of a frivolous defense on appeal, Houston requests an
award of damages, the recovery of attorney's fees and the award of costs pursuant to both Rule
33 & 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures. Upon request of the Court, a memorandum
of costs and an affidavit of attorney's foes shall be provided.
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CONCLUSION.
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Houston requests this court to vacate the Defendant's
conviction for loss of jurisdiction in the course of the proceedings for not providing a complete
court - as the Sixth Amendment the court cannot deprive the accused of counsel at trial. Also,
the defendant was deprived effective assistance of counsel during his near two year pretrial
proceedings. It was error for the defendant's counsel to be permitted to withdraw two months
before trial without cause particularly since her conduct had prejudiced the defendant and her
reign of representations lasted for nearly two years, resulting in the loss of suppression issues, the
failure to sever prejudicial claims, repeated continuances, the lack of preparation for trial, no
witnesses being called for his defense, and the apparent waiver of a preliminary hearing.
Meanwhile, it is obvious that the arresting officer and agents of the State had zero probable cause
to arrest Mr. Houston and to seize his lawfully purchased crystal iodine. At the time of arrest,
Det. Funk knew from Mr. Houston and the Emery Animal Clinic both that Houston was a farrier
and that he had a history of purchasing iodine crystals and iodine solution both from the clinic,
and that he had acquired the general reputation as being a farrier according to employees of the
clinic. Then following the arrest, during the interview, the agents and officers exploited Mr.
Houston and his circumstances by forcing an appearing consensual confession, when "but for"
the false arrest and the false representations of leniency by a lawyer made in light of Miranda, the
confession never would have been obtained.
Because the State's defense to Houston's appeal is frivolous in light of State v. Pedockie,
2006 UT 28 (Supreme Court, May 12, 2006), damages, reimbursement of attorney's fees, and
costs should be provided pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
PARRISH, Justice:
ill
Defendant Robert Brian Pedockie was charged with
aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony. During pretrial
proceedings, Pedockie was represented by a string of various
public defenders and private attorneys, all of whom either
withdrew or were fired. Despite Pedockie's invocation of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the trial court allowed the
trial to proceed with Pedockie representing himself. Pedockie
was convicted and appealed.
^2
The court of appeals held that Pedockie voluntarily
waived his right to counsel through his dilatory conduct. It
nevertheless reversed his conviction, holding that the waiver was
not knowing and intelligent. We affirm the reversal of
Pedockie's conviction, but on different grounds. Like the court
of appeals, we recognize that an accused may voluntarily waive
his right to counsel through his conduct. But we find no such
voluntary waiver in this case.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1)3
We recite the facts in a manner consistent with the
jury's verdict. On January 3, 2001, Pedockie and his cousin
kidnapped Nicole Sather, Pedockie's ex-girlfriend. When Sather
attempted to escape from Pedockie's truck, Pedockie's cousin shot
at her, and Pedockie restrained her. The next day, Pedockie
threatened to kill Sather and himself. When Pedockie stopped for
gas, Sather escaped with the help of a gas station employee.
Pedockie was later arrested and charged with aggravated
kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
section 76-5-302.1
1(4
At Pedockie's initial appearance on February 20, 2001,
the trial judge found Pedockie indigent and appointed the Weber
County Public Defenders' Association ("PDA") to defend him. The
judge also gave Pedockie a copy of the Information that had been
filed and advised him of the charges against him and the
potential penalties associated therewith. Pedockie requested
disposition of his case according to the Speedy Trial Statute,
which entitles a defendant who is imprisoned to be tried within
120 days of the request.2 At a later hearing, the judge set
Pedockie's jury trial for August 13, 2001.
%S
On August 1, 2001, at the request of Pedockie's PDA
attorney, who needed additional time to prepare, the trial judge
continued the trial to December 10, 2001. The trial was
subsequently continued to February 4, 2 002, to accommodate a
conflict in the prosecutor's schedule.
%6
Scheduling conflicts, however, were not the only
difficulties arising during pretrial proceedings. Difficulties
between Pedockie and his attorneys were a recurring theme.
Pedockie's first two PDA attorneys withdrew, through no fault of
Pedockie, because one had a conflict of interest and the other
lost his contract with the PDA. And less than a month before
trial, Pedockie's third PDA attorney, James Retallick, also moved
to withdraw.
1|7
Retallick informed the trial judge that Pedockie was
insisting that he file four motions that Retallick believed were
"absolutely frivolous." Although Retallick had explained to
Pedockie why he could not in good faith file the motions,
Pedockie nevertheless believed that Retallick was not
1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999).

2

Id.
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representing his best interests and requested the appointment of
a PDA attorney who would file them. The trial judge explained
that Pedockie did not have a right to "pick and choose" an
attorney from the PDA, stating, "I can appoint an attorney to
work with you but if you don't want to accept his advice, you've
either got to represent yourself or get your own attorney."
Pedockie stated that he did not wish to proceed pro se and agreed
to have Retallick continue the representation. The next day,
however, Pedockie fired him.
1|8
A couple of weeks later, Pedockie requested that the
judge release the PDA office because he had hired private
attorney Ed Brass to represent him. Stating that Pedockie was
entitled to legal representation, the trial judge granted his
request and continued the trial to April 15, 2002, to give Brass
time to prepare.
%9
Three days before trial, Brass moved to withdraw as
counsel, stating that he had an ethical conflict with Pedockie
that made representation impossible. Brass was unwilling to stay
on the case as standby counsel because he did not believe that
Pedockie was "sophisticated enough to handle a first degree
felony trial" without full-time counsel. The trial judge
reluctantly granted Brass's motion to withdraw, stating, "I want
Mr. Pedockie to understand, I'm not gonna continue this case
again . . . . [Y]ou either get an attorney who will represent you
on the matter or you're just gonna represent yourself next time
it's scheduled."
HlO On May 1, Pedockie appeared in court without an
attorney and reported that he was still attempting to hire one.
The judge continued the case until May 2 9 and again admonished
Pedockie to get an attorney. But on May 29, Pedockie again
appeared without counsel, explaining that he had been unable to
find an attorney to file his motion for prosecutorial misconduct
because "[e]verybody thinks it's unethical to bring."
Ull The trial judge warned Pedockie that he was going to
set the case for trial and that Pedockie would have to get an
attorney or proceed without one. Pedockie emphasized the
seriousness of his case, explaining that "you're talking about my
c
e at stake." The prosecutor asked the judge to make a record
Pedockie's "election to represent himself at the time of
is voluntary and knowing." The judge responded that "the
m is he doesn't want to represent himself. . . . But on
,w*r side, every time we give him an attorney or have him
attorney, the attorney withdraws." When Pedockie
^. that he wanted another attorney appointed who would
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file his motions, the judge stated, "See, that's the problem.
You need to start following the advice of the attorney that's
representing you instead of you trying to tell him what to do."
1l2 After scheduling trial for September 30, 2002, the
trial judge informed Pedockie that he could hire a private
attorney, but warned him that the trial would not be continued
again. The trial judge also appointed standby counsel, but
clarified that Pedockie was still responsible for filing and
arguing his own motions.
Kl3 At a July 31 hearing, Pedockie announced that he had
hired Paul Grant as his attorney but that Grant had indicated he
was going to withdraw. Pedockie asked the judge to appoint
primary counsel who could assist him in arguing his motions, and
the judge chastised him for his unwillingness to follow the
advice of his prior attorneys. But when Pedockie persisted, the
trial judge relented:
The Court: I can appoint the public
defenders' office. I cannot pick and choose
which attorney represents you. There are at
least three people in that office that you've
had, and now they no longer can represent
you. So do you want the public defenders'
office or not?
Mr. Pedockie: As of right now, I'd like to —
I need a attorney-The Court:

Okay.

Mr. Pedockie:

--Unless you're gonna--

The Court: I'll appoint the public
defenders' office for the third time then.
Okay.
A hearing on Pedockie's motions was then set for August 12.
Thereafter, the trial judge indicated that Pedockie needed to
give a copy of his motions to the PDA attorney prior to the
hearing, and the clerk suggested that they coordinate with the
PDA to make sure August 12 was an acceptable date. All of this
was consistent with the fact that the PDA had been appointed to
act as Pedockie's primary, rather than standby, counsel.
1|14 Prison officials failed to transport Pedockie to the
August 12 hearing. In Pedockie's absence, the trial judge
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informed Martin Gravis, the PDA attorney who had been assigned to
represent Pedockie following the July 31 hearing, that he "was
not inclined to appoint a public defender" for Pedockie and that
Gravis was there only in the capacity as standby counsel. The
motion hearing was then rescheduled for the following day.
1|l5 The next day, Pedockie expressed surprise and confusion
when he learned that Gravis was acting only as standby counsel
and would not argue the motions. Pedockie again requested that
the court appoint an attorney to argue his motions, emphasizing
their importance to his case and his desire to see them argued
properly. The trial judge declined, indicating that he would not
appoint an attorney because of Pedockie's insistence that his
attorneys pursue unethical courses of action. The judge
reiterated that, if Pedockie wanted an attorney, he would have to
hire one himself.
1|16 During a hearing on August 21, the trial judge again
scolded Pedockie, refused to appoint an attorney, and informed
Pedockie that he must hire a private attorney or proceed pro se.
He told Pedockie that his attorneys have "always asked to be
recused because you want them to do something that's illegal
that's a violation of the Canons of Ethics." Pedockie insisted
that he could not afford a private attorney and that he was
invoking his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
%11 At a September 18 pretrial conference,
to submit the jury instructions that his standby
prepared and again requested that an attorney be
represent him. The trial judge refused, stating
waived his right to counsel.

Pedockie failed
counsel had
appointed to
that he had

^|18 Pedockie's jury trial began on September 30, 2002.
Pedockie again requested counsel, complaining that he was neither
"educated nor familiar with the rules and proceedings" of the
court and did not know how many juror challenges he had. The
trial judge denied Pedockie's request, finding that Pedockie had
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to an attorney.
Pedockie then asked that standby counsel be excused from the case
because the whole case was a "scam and a mockracy" and standby
counsel was "just taking up the taxpayers' dollars." After
explaining the benefits of having standby counsel who was trained
in the law, the judge granted Pedockie's request, and Pedockie
proceeded to represent himself.
i|l9 The jury found Pedockie guilty of aggravated
kidnapping, and he was sentenced. Pedockie appealed, arguing
that he was deprived of his constitutional right to assistance of
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counsel.3 The court of appeals reversed Pedockie's conviction
and remanded the case for a new trial.
H2 0 The court of appeals first considered whether
Pedockie's conduct evidenced a voluntary waiver of his right to
counsel. Recognizing that a defendant's decision to waive
counsel may be subject to constitutionally permissible
constraints, the court of appeals reasoned that the trial judge
reasonably required Pedockie to either accept representation by
the PDA, hire private counsel, or proceed pro se. It therefore
held that Pedockie had voluntarily waived his right to counsel
through his conduct.
1(21 The court of appeals then considered whether Pedockie's
waiver was knowing and intelligent. Because the trial judge had
failed to conduct an on-the-record colloquy with Pedockie to
inform him of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, the court of appeals was confronted with the
question of whether the case involved "extraordinary
circumstances" that would require a de novo review of the record.
It concluded it need not decide that question because there was
"nothing in the record to persuade [it] that [Pedockie's] waiver
was knowing and intelligent."4 It therefore reversed Pedockie's
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
H22 The State petitioned for certiorari, which we granted.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3) (a) .5
STANDARD OF REVIEW
f23 "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals, not the decision of the trial court."6 Whether Pedockie
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to
counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.7 While we review
questions of law for correctness, a trial court's factual

3

State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224, 1 1, 95 P.3d 1182.

4

isL 1 35.

5

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) (2002) .

6

Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33, % 4, 978
P.2d 460.
7

State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1998) .
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findings may be reversed on appeal only if they are clearly
erroneous.8
ANALYSIS
124 The State urges us to find that Pedockie waived his
right to counsel through his dilatory conduct and that he did so
knowingly and intelligently. Whether a defendant may waive his
right to counsel through his conduct is an issue of first
impression in this court. We therefore begin by addressing the
substantive requirements for waiver of a defendant's right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment and the procedure to be
followed by appellate courts when reviewing cases of alleged
waiver.9 With these substantive and procedural requirements in
mind, we turn to the court of appeals' conclusion that Pedockie
waived his right to counsel through his dilatory conduct but that
the waiver was invalid because it was not knowing and
intelligent.
I.

THE RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

^25 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees defendants the right to counsel in felony
proceedings.10 As the United States Supreme Court articulated in
Powell v. Alabama, "The right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel."11
^[26 Defendants also have the right to waive their right to
counsel. The United States Supreme Court in Faretta v.
California12 held that the Sixth Amendment implicitly guarantees
criminal defendants the ability to waive their right to the
assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. Before permitting a
defendant to do so, however, a trial court should ensure that the
8

State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).

9

State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224, % 30 n.5, 95 P.3d 1182
(noting that Pedockie did not preserve a state constitutional
claim).
10

U.S. Const, amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.").
11

287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) .

12

422 U.S. 806, 818-32 (1975).
7
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waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.13 A defendant
should "be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish that he knows
what he is doing."14
12 7 Courts have recognized three methods pursuant to which
a defendant may give up his constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel: waiver, forfeiture, and waiver by
conduct.15 We outline the elements of each.
A.

True Waiver

H28 True waiver is the most common method by which
defendants forsake their right to counsel. True waiver typically
occurs when a defendant affirmatively requests permission to
proceed pro se.16 In State v. Bakalov. we required that
defendants "clearly and unequivocally" request selfrepresentation in order to waive their right to counsel.17
1|29 When a defendant requests to proceed pro se, his waiver
will be valid only if he acts knowingly and intelligently, being
aware of the dangers inherent in self-representation.1B The most
reliable way for a trial court to determine whether a defendant
is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation
is to engage in a colloquy on the record. At times, however, we
have found a waiver of the right to counsel absent a colloquy.
For example, in State v. Frampton, we found that a defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel when he
affirmatively requested to proceed pro se despite the fact that
the trial court had not engaged in a colloquy.19 We reasoned
that the defendant should have realized the "value of counsel"

13

See id. at 835.

14

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

15

See United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099 (3d
Cir. 1995) .
16

Id.

17

1999 UT 45, 1 16, 979 P.2d 799.

18

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.

19

737 P.2d 183, 187-89 (Utah 1987).
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because he was represented by counsel in a prior trial.20
Additionally, we concluded that he must have realized the
seriousness of the charges filed against him because the judge
had appointed standby counsel over his objection21 and the judge
had explained the charges, including the maximum penalty
associated therewith, in two prior trials involving the same
charges .22
1(30 True waiver does not apply
Pedockie never expressed a desire to
contrary, the record is replete with
insisting that he "want[ed] adequate
"not going to represent [himself]."
B.

in this case because
represent himself. To the
instances of Pedockie
counsel" and that he was

Forfeiture

1131 While waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a
known right, forfeiture occupies the opposite end of the
spectrum. Unlike waiver, "forfeiture results in the loss of a
right regardless of the defendant's knowledge thereof and
irrespective of whether the defendant intended to relinquish the
right."23
f32 In United States v. Goldberg, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed that a defendant may be
deemed to have forfeited his right to counsel when he engages in
"extremely dilatory conduct" or abusive behavior, such as
physically assaulting counsel.24 When circumstances are
egregious enough to constitute forfeiture, a court need not
determine whether a defendant understands the risks of selfrepresentation or warn him that he will lose his right to
counsel. But because of its drastic nature, a defendant must
engage in extreme conduct before forfeiture may be imposed.25 We
find no basis for imposing forfeiture under the facts presented
here.

20

Id. at 189.
Id. at 189 n.19.
Id. at 189.

23

United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d Cir.

1995) .
24

Id. at 1101.
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C.

Waiver by Conduct

1)3 3 Waiver by conduct, often referred to as implied waiver,
combines elements of both true waiver and forfeiture.26 "Once a
defendant has been warned that he will lose his attorney if he
engages in dilatory tactics, any misconduct thereafter may be
treated as an implied request to proceed pro se and thus, as a
waiver of the right to counsel."27 The conduct required to give
rise to an implied waiver does not have to be as extreme as that
required for forfeiture. And unlike the situation in cases of
true waiver, a defendant need not intend to relinquish the right
to counsel.28 But the defendant must have been warned that
continuation of the unacceptable conduct will result in a waiver
of the right to counsel. As is the case in a true waiver
situation, the waiver also must be knowing and intelligent. In
other words, the defendant must have also possessed an awareness
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation at the
time of the implied waiver.29
134 While the United States Supreme Court has never
specifically addressed whether a defendant may waive the right to
counsel through inappropriate conduct,30 it has recognized that a
defendant may lose the constitutional right to be present at
trial because of such conduct.31 In Illinois v. Allen, the trial
court had warned the defendant that he would lose his right to be
present at his trial because of his disruptive behavior, yet he
continued "in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and
disrespectful of the court that his trial [could not] be carried
on with him in the courtroom."32 Consequently, he lost the
constitutional right to be present, even though he did not
affirmatively relinquish it.33 Thus, Allen suggests that a

26

Id. at 1100-01.

27

IdL. at 1100.
Id. at 1101.

29

Id. at 1102.

30

Id.

31

Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).

32

Id.

33

Id.
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defendant can lose constitutional rights because of his conduct
so long as he is "aware of the consequences of his actions."34
^J35 In United States v. Weninger,35 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied analogous analysis in
holding that the defendant had waived his right to counsel by
failing to secure an attorney for trial. The defendant was given
ample time and was warned to obtain an attorney, but he
strategically and stubbornly failed to do so.36 The Tenth
Circuit held that this dilatory conduct should be treated as a
request to proceed pro se.37
^36 In summary, before we will find an implied waiver of
the right to counsel based on a defendant's conduct, two
requirements must be satisfied. First, the implied waiver must
be voluntary. Second, the waiver must have been made knowingly
and intelligently.
^3 7 For an implied waiver to be voluntary, the trial court
must warn the defendant of the specific conduct that will give
rise to the waiver of his right to counsel. In other words, when
a trial court believes that a defendant's conduct is unacceptable
and will result in a waiver of his right to counsel, the court
must warn the defendant that continuation of the unacceptable
conduct will be treated as an implied request to proceed pro se
and, thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel.38 This warning
must be explicit so that a defendant clearly understands both the
nature of the unacceptable conduct and the implications of any
such future conduct.
1(3 8 For an implied waiver to be knowing and intelligent,
the trial court must ensure that the defendant is cognizant of

34

Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101 (emphasis added).

35

624 F.2d 163, 166-67 (10th Cir. 1980).

36

Id.; see also United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 694
(7th Cir. 1992) (finding that the combination of the defendant's
''ability to pay for counsel plus refusal to do so . . . waive [d]
the right to counsel at trial").
37

Weninger, 624 F.2d at 166-67; see also Goldberg, 67 F.3d
at 1102-03 (refusing to find waiver by conduct because the court
had not made the defendant aware of the risks of selfrepresentation) .
38

Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100-03.
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the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. The court
should explain the consequences of a decision to proceed pro se
and, at a minimum, must
ascertain that the defendant possesses the
intelligence and capacity to understand and
appreciate the consequences of the decision
to represent himself, including the
expectation that the defendant will comply
with technical rules and the recognition that
presenting a defense is not just a matter of
telling one's story; and . . . ascertain that
the defendant comprehends the nature of the
charges and proceedings, the range of
permissible punishments, and any additional
facts essential to a broad understanding of
the case.39
1|3 9 Trial courts generally evaluate a defendant's
understanding and intelligence by conducting a colloquy on the
record. In those cases where a defendant continues to insist on
his right to counsel, it may seem awkward for a trial court to
engage in a typical colloquy regarding the inherent dangers of
self-representation. But we still strongly encourage trial
courts to do so as a means to ensure that a defendant is aware of
the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation.40
II.

DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A WAIVER

f4 0 While we have urged that trial courts engage in an onthe-record colloquy with defendants to ensure that they are aware
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, we have
not imposed an absolute requirement that they do so. Rather, we
have recognized that the validity of a defendant's waiver turns
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each
case.
1(41 Relying on admittedly confusing language from some of
our prior cases, the court of appeals stated that, in the absence
of a colloquy, appellate courts are required to conduct a de novo
39

State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 1998).

40

See Truiillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 575 (Wyo. 2000)
(explaining that a warning in a waiver by conduct situation
"should be comparable in content to the warning given to a
defendant who affirmatively asserts his right to selfrepresentation") .
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review of the record to determine the validity of a defendant's
waiver of the right to counsel only in "extraordinary
circumstances.7' It then concluded that it need not evaluate
Pedockie's case for such extraordinary circumstances because
>x
there is simply nothing in the record to persuade us that
[Pedockie's] waiver was knowing and intelligent."41
1142 We take this opportunity to clarify our prior case law
regarding appellate review in cases involving waiver of the right
to counsel. As previously stated, before we will accept a
defendant's waiver of his right to counsel, we have required that
he be "aware of the dangers and disadvantages[] of selfrepresentation,"42 and we continue to strongly recommend a
colloquy on the record as the preferred method of determining
whether a defendant is aware of these risks. Indeed, a trial
court generally cannot determine a defendant's understanding
without engaging in the "penetrating questioning" found in a
colloquy.43 The sixteen-point colloquy found in State v.
Frampton44 establishes a sound framework for efficient and
complete questioning. Moreover, on appeal, such a colloquy
provides the reviewing court with " x an objective basis for
review7 upon the almost inevitable challenge to the waiver by the
defendant who proceeds pro se and is subsequently convicted."45
f43 In declining to review the record de novo, the court of
appeals relied on State v. Heaton, where we held that a reviewing
court could engage in de novo review only in "extraordinary
circumstances."46 But in two cases following Heaton, we found
that de novo review was appropriate in the absence of a colloquy
and never indicated that such a review was dependent on the

41

State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224, 1 35, 95 P.3d 1182.

42

State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
43

Id.

44

IcL_ at 187 n.12.

45

Wayne R. LaFave et al., 3 Criminal Procedure § 11.5(c)
(2d ed. 1999) (quoting People v. Sawyer, 438 N.E.2d 1133, 1138
(N.Y. 1982)); see also State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 918 (Utah
1998).
46

958 P.2d at 918.
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existence of extraordinary circumstances.47
it is not.

We now clarify that

144 When this court stated in Heaton that a de novo review
was appropriate only in extraordinary circumstances, we cited the
Ninth Circuit case of Harding v. Lewis.46 But the Harding court
actually allowed for de novo review absent a colloquy; it only
explained that a valid waiver absent a colloquy should "rarely"
be found.49 Our mistaken interpretation of Harding, combined
with the fact that Heaton is inconsistent with this court's more
recent decisions, suggests the need for us to rearticulate the
procedure to be followed by reviewing courts when evaluating the
validity of a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel in the
absence of a colloquy.50
K45 Absent a colloquy on the record, a reviewing court
should review the record de novo to determine whether the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel. De novo review is appropriate because the validity of a
waiver does not turn upon "whether the trial judge actually
conducted the colloquy,"51 but upon whether the defendant
understood the consequences of waiver.52 A de novo review allows
a reviewing court to analyze the "particular facts and
circumstances surrounding each case" to make that
determination.53 But we pause to note that, considering the
strong presumption against waiver and the fundamental nature of
the right to counsel, any doubts must be resolved in favor of the
defendant. We therefore anticipate that reviewing courts will
rarely find a valid waiver of the right to counsel absent a
colloquy.

47

See State v. Hassan, 2004 UT 99, 1 22, 108 P.3d 695;
State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, % 70, 63 P.3d 731.
48

834 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1987).

49

Id.

50

See Hassan, 2004 UT 99, 1 22; Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, 1 70;
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 188 (Utah 1987).
51

Hassan, 2004 UT 99, 1 22.

52

Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188.
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III.

PEDOCKIE'S CASE

1(46 We now turn to the particular facts of this case. This
case is a prime example of the confusion and inconsistency that
can permeate proceedings in the absence of an explicit warning
and colloquy regarding the right to counsel. In the face of such
confusion, we cannot find a voluntary, knowing, or intelligent
waiver of Pedockie7s right to counsel.
147 First, we conclude that Pedockie did not voluntarily
waive his right to counsel through his conduct. While the trial
judge repeatedly chastised Pedockie for his past unwillingness to
follow counsel's advice, his statements with respect to
Pedockie's right to appointed counsel were inconsistent and
confusing.
1|48 For example, when Retallick moved to withdraw, the
trial judge warned Pedockie that he would need to either accept
Retallick's advice, represent himself, or get his own attorney.
But after Pedockie fired Retallick, the trial judge ordered a
continuance, stating that "you're entitled to have an attorney
represent you, and, obviously, Mr. Brass . . . hasn't had enough
time to get ready."
i|49 When Brass withdrew, the trial judge continued to scold
Pedockie for prior delays and maintain that Pedockie would need
to hire a private attorney or proceed pro se. Nevertheless, at
the July 31 hearing, the trial judge agreed to "appoint the
public defender's office for the third time" and gave every
indication that the PDA attorney would act as primary, rather
than standby, counsel. Pedockie relied on this statement when he
failed to retain private counsel and appeared at the August 13
hearing expecting representation by the PDA. He was thus
understandably confused when the judge insisted that the PDA
attorney's role was limited to that of standby counsel. It is
particularly troubling that, after agreeing to appoint counsel on
July 31, the trial judge never warned Pedockie of the conduct
that would give rise to an implied waiver of his right to
appointed counsel but nevertheless imposed such a waiver sometime
between the July 31 and August 13 hearings when Pedockie does not
appear to have engaged in any objectionable conduct. Because any
uncertainty over an alleged waiver of the right to counsel must
be resolved in favor of an accused, we are unable to find a
voluntary waiver under these circumstances.
1)5 0 Finally, even if Pedockie had voluntarily waived his
right to counsel, our de novo review of the record fails to
establish that any implied waiver was knowing and intelligent.
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There is nothing in the record to indicate that, at the time of
the alleged waiver, Pedockie appreciated "the consequences of the
decision to represent himself, including the expectation that [he
would need to] comply with technical rules and the recognition
that presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling one's
story."54
i|51 Although the record does contain evidence that Pedockie
wanted his case to be tried by an attorney because he knew
"nothing about the law" and was not familiar with the rules of
the court, such general knowledge does not necessarily evidence
an understanding of the technical requirements inherent in
presenting one's case. While Pedockie arguably obtained some
understanding of these technical requirements during the course
of the proceedings, the record is devoid of evidence that
Pedockie understood these requirements prior to the time of the
alleged waiver. For instance, Pedockie was informed of the
technical rules of the court when the judge appointed standby
counsel and explained that standby counsel could help prepare
jury instructions and cross-examine and subpoena witnesses for
trial but would not argue Pedockie's motions. By this point,
however, the trial judge had already ruled that Pedockie was not
entitled to appointment of primary counsel. Therefore, any
knowledge that Pedockie may have had regarding the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation was too little, too late.
CONCLUSION
1|52 We agree with the court of appeals that Pedockie is
entitled to a new trial. We have reviewed the record and
conclude that Pedockie did not voluntarily, knowingly, or
intelligently waive his right to the assistance of counsel.

1)53 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Durrant, and Justice Nehring concur in Justice Parrish's
opinion.

State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 918 (Utah 1998).
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